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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the spatial imprint and social impacts of the emerging geographies of 
concentrated overseas investment into London’s high-end real estate market, particularly the 
boroughs of Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea. Framed by literatures on the 1% and 
the super-rich, and based on a mixed methodological approach of qualitative interviews with 
intermediaries and a quantitative mapping of overseas investors using 2011 census data, the 
results speak to the pervasive nature of ‘‘safe-haven’’ seeking in London real estate and its 
attendant transnational provenance set within a laissez-faire regulatory framework. In so 
doing, it makes an important contribution to the geographies of the super-rich, the class 
geographies of London, and the broader sense that overseas investors are producing what we 
call ‘‘pied-a`-terre’’ urbanism which builds on a conventional gentrification framework 
(exclusionary displacement and a more affluent incoming group) but also exceeds it in 
several ways, leading to an increasingly socially attenuated landscape. This exceeding relates 
to: a different kind of rent gap, in that it is not speculative but safe-haven seeking, a 
guaranteed return on investment, and occurs without previous disinvestment; the agents are 
not traditional gentrifiers; the transnational nature of the process, with no attachment to 
particular places like in the traditional gentrification model; and a process focused on super-
prime areas and completely independent of the existing gentrification narrative in London. 
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Introduction 
Since the 2008 economic crisis, global inequalities have further widened, with widespread 
government-induced austerity counterposed with the boom in luxury real estate and the 
selling of citizenship to the highest bidders. These trends have stoked greater interest in 
the lives of the richest 1% and the coming of a ‘‘second gilded age’’ (Breau, 2014; Dorling, 
2014; Short, 2013: 27). In the United States, the top 1% now earn 20% of the national 
income; in the UK, they earn 15% (Dorling, 2014), and this proportion has been increasing 
since the 1980s. Simultaneously, the number of high net worth individuals (HNWI, with 
financial assets over $1 m) and ultra-high net worth individuals (UHNWI, with financial 
assets over $30 m) has grown substantially during this crisis period, resulting in a more 
pervasive scanning of ‘‘safe haven’’ investment opportunities (Hay, 2013: 4). 
Yet despite repeated calls to study the ‘‘super-rich’’ (Beaverstock et al., 2004; Hay, 2013; 
Ley, 2010; Pow, 2011), research on the geographies of this group remains empirically thin, 
conceptually undeveloped and statistically unreliable. As Pow (2011: 392) suggested, there is 
a ‘‘. . . need for . . . research to critically explore how transnational practices of global elites 
are spatialized in and through the urban built environment to produce new geographies of 
wealth, privilege and exclusion’’. Addressing this dearth is especially urgent given the 
mutations in the wake of the post-2008 financial crisis period, during which time safehaven 
investments by the super-rich have led to a conspicuous explosion of high-end, 
luxury real estate in highly-desirable, globally-connected sites, resulting in conspicuous yet 
little-studied transnational transfers of wealth. Increasingly then, the super-rich and their 
geographical impacts are not just homegrown and place-bound, but increasingly mobile, 
importing and exporting wealth quickly: ‘‘the biggest difference in the luxury market 
between now and a decade ago is that the world is smaller . . . [and it’s] easier to scout – 
and travel- the world to do so’’ (Logan, 2014) since 2008. This ‘‘bolt hole’’ version of flight 
capital has been pouring into global cities from Miami (Pristin, 2013) to New York 
(Barrionuevo, 2012), Singapore (Pow, 2011), Los Angeles (Halderman, 2014), Paris 
(Kuper, 2011) and Hong Kong (Knight Frank, 2014). Across this global hedging, 
however, London stands apart – it was the world’s most luxurious market in 2014, and 
contained the most UHNWIs of any global city (Dorling, 2014; Knight Frank, 2014). The 
most recent Sunday Times ‘‘super-rich list’’ identified London as having more billionaires 
(72) than any other city in the world, more than a few of which spend precious little time in 
the capital (Arlidge, 2014). In 2011, »5.2 billion was spent by overseas investors on London 
housing, ‘‘more than total Government investment in the Affordable Housing Programme 
for the whole of England’’! (Heywood, 2012: 3). 
In this paper, we focus on the outcomes of one emerging geography strongly associated with 
the conspicuous housing geographies of a key subgroup of the super-rich – the residential 
colonization by overseas investors of traditionally elite areas of global cities, and specifically 
with what impacts upon London’s social geographies and built environment. Conceptually, 
this paper contributes to understanding how the 1% and super-rich literatures can usefully 
foreground the recent overseas investor phenomenon. Empirically, this paper contributes to 
understanding the imprint and impacts of overseas residential investment upon the class 
geographies of London, a longstanding crucible marked by sharp debates over the nature 
of the post-industrial city, class displacement and class replacement (e.g. Butler et al., 2008; 
Hamnett, 2015; Watt, 2013; Wyly and Davidson, 2012). Methodologically, we 
combined interviews of investors and their intermediaries (see Atkinson, 2016) with an 
ambitious attempt to estimate their spatial imprint using routine administrative data. The 
paper ends with a broader consideration of the emerging geographies produced by overseas 
investors, which we term ‘‘pied-a` -terre’’ urbanism, and how they exceed the existing class 
geographies (and the traditional gentrification narrative) in London more specifically and 
current trends in global urbanism more generally. 
The combination of the mixed method approach, the focus on post-2008 overseas 
investors, and engagement with debates over London class geographies also sets this paper 
apart from research by Atkinson (2016), whose work centered on the full breadth of 
London’s super-rich but only considered their (selective) encounters in public space, as well 
as Ley (2010), whose focus on overseas investors in Vancouver differed from the London 
case study, which presents a vastly larger and more complex example, set within a context of 
a post-2008 generalized global scanning of safe havens. Ultimately, we seek to flesh out 
Hay’s suggestion (2013: 11) that ‘‘the super-rich can transform places substantially . . . they 
are reordering inner parts of cities’’. By doing so, we avoid the sometimes superficial 
casestudy approach heavily reliant on think-tank studies (Paris, 2013) by favoring primary 
data and mixed methods. 
 
Conceptualizing the emerging geographies of the overseas investor 
In order to foreground the geographies of the overseas investor, we bring two key literatures 
into conversation. Beaverstock et al. (2004) were among the first to seriously consider the 
geographies of the super-rich, a group they equated with the highest net worth individuals. 
They insisted that this group was necessarily transnational in nature, with a global 
orientation and cosmopolitan disposition and occupying, seemingly at will, the ‘‘fast 
spaces’’ of globalization. Hay (2013) noted that this fast space can take two forms: a 
sequestered, walled compound model (Pow, 2011), or the more visible influx to preexisting 
areas of wealth, usually in (global) cities, that threaten to reshape existing social 
and built fabrics – our case study of London will delve into this second scenario. This 
confirms the highly mobile nature of the super-rich over the past decade, but this does 
not mean that they are free floating. Pow (2011: 385) talks about ‘‘far from being 
freewheeling global agents that rarely touch down on earth, these global elites . . . do 
require specific spatialities in global cities to reproduce their supposedly cosmopolitan 
interests, lifestyles and practices . . .’’. And in his own consideration of transnational elites, 
Ley (2004: 151) cautions us that even the most powerful global subjects face ‘‘circumscribed 
everyday lives’’ bound by local particularities and constraints, never entirely driven by 
economic motivations. 
While we take these cautions, there can be no doubt that current overseas investors – 
consisting of the super-rich looking to park their money in overseas real estate – are 
overwhelmingly driven by economic concerns, that they represent a clear case of 
globalization ‘‘from above’’, and have been given a certain rein to shape the local real 
estate market in existing elite areas via an indirectly abetting state (Beaverstock et al., 
2004; Heywood, 2012). This also underlines the ability of the super-rich to obtain allied 
resources necessary for their increasingly transnational lives: passports through the selling of 
citizenship to the highest bidders (Frank, 2014; Ong, 1999), and of course second- and 
thirdhomes, usually in global cities (Heywood, 2012). These investments are intimately 
related to the notion of excess capital sloshing around the globe, seeking the guaranteed 
tangible returns that high-end property in established niches of global cities offer within the 
uncertainties of the post-2008 capitalist order. Indeed, if even a small amount of 
‘‘missing’’ private financial wealth (Henry, 2012), estimated in 2010 between $21 and $32 
trillion and protected from taxes by an entire global offshore industry, were spent on 
overseas real estate, it would have enormous impacts on particular cities, neighborhoods 
and urban development. 
Hay (2013) made the important point that there is nothing frivolous about studying 
the super-rich – one cannot possibly understand inequality without considering the top 
earners, as their fates are tied up with those at the very bottom (see also Massey, 2007). 
This relational perspective brings up the second literature on the 1%, which offers a more 
critical take. This is because the top-end of society is presented more as a problematic and 
corrosive grouping (Dorling, 2014; Sayer, 2014) than as an intriguing 
empirical gap. In Dorling’s Inequality and the 1% (2014), he argues that by grabbing 
more and more income and wealth, the 1% have become increasingly insulated, a drain 
on society, extracting more than they create, with pernicious economic, social and 
political effects. Dorling argues that the 1% actually deepen inequality by promoting 
elitism, blocking social mobility, and calling for greater austerity via their 
disproportionate influence on politics. An advantage to Dorling’s approach more 
specifically, and the literature on the 1% more generally, is that it firmly embeds their 
fortunes onto the most recent global economic crisis: ‘‘since 2008, after the initial shock 
of the drop in the value of their stock holdings, the rich in both the US and the UK 
maneuvered to become much richer’’ (2014: 3), partially via haven-seeking behavior that 
is the centerpiece of this article. 
By taking insights from the literatures on the super-rich (their transnational nature 
and global reach, although never completely unfettered) and the 1% (its relational and 
critical focus on class antagonisms and class politics, especially since 2008), we can frame 
our approach to the under-studied geographies of overseas investors in several ways. 
First, overseas investors are opportunistic in their search for safe-haven investments 
when faced with uncertainty at home, including political instability, currency 
devaluation, more onerous taxation or capital restraints. Second, the post-2008 context 
has accelerated this global search, with traditional destinations becoming even more 
sought-after. Third, overseas investors have important local impacts upon the social 
and built landscapes (Ley, 2010). To empirically verify these claims requires an 
approach that combines on-the-ground experiences of change with more quantitative 
mappings of the spatial imprint. 
In so doing, we can better understand how the overseas investor fits into both socially 
and spatially into the existing cleavages of London. Watt (2013) outlined a series of debates 
around London’s recent transition toward an increasingly fragmented class landscape. On 
the one hand, there is the replacement thesis, in which deindustrialization and 
professionalization have led to the upgrading of former working-class areas as the 
working class are themselves replaced (Hamnett, 2015). For instance, Butler et al. (2008) 
measured class upgrading across London between 1981 and 2001, itself centered in Inner 
London and associated with professionalization and gentrification, using descriptive 
statistics at the borough level. On the other hand, there is the displacement thesis, 
whereby class upgrading is actually a far more conflicted, polarized and forceful process, 
a reminder that class antagonisms have not disappeared in the post-industrial, ‘‘creative 
class’’ city. Davidson and Wyly’s (2012) classical urban ecology of London, based on 
Census data from 2001 used factor analysis for small neighborhoods and found that class 
divides were alive and well in London. We want to see the purchase of these two theses in 
the early 2010s, with the increasingly transnational, uncoupled nature of overseas 
investment to Inner London, propped up by lax tax laws, a relatively weak Pound and 
the deliberate policy of allowing foreigners to be ‘‘domiciled’’ in the UK, thus freeing them 
from being residents that would have to pay tax on (foreign) income, capital gains tax and 
inheritance tax (Lanchester, 2012). The state’s role in enticing peripatetic super-rich 
investment translated in 2012 into a market where a full 85% of buyers in the superprime 
market (over $15.9 m) were foreigners, topped only by Monaco (100%) and Paris 
(95%) (Powley and Warrick-Ching, 2012). In the next section, we outline our mixed 
methodological approach to understanding the imprint and impacts of the overseas 
investor within London. 
 
Methods 
We are not the first to study overseas investors in London (Heywood, 2012; Paris, 2013), but 
we are the first to propose a mixed methodological approach: part quantitative, in terms of 
using statistical inferences to identify potential areas of strong overseas investment, and part 
qualitative, in terms of convenience interviews (n¼18) with intermediaries of the super-rich. 
While not an expressed focus of this paper, it bears noting that the intermediary economy is 
crucial in enabling a smooth ride for the super-rich, particularly in overseas and expatriate 
contexts where investors may be unsure about the (local) rules of the game. As such, the 
interviewees were well-placed to appreciate the process of overseas investment, ranging from 
those who research local real estate markets, to those agents who work directly with sales of 
high-priced homes, to more modest go-betweens whose business revolves around catering to 
the super-rich, such as locksmiths and nannies (see Beaverstock, 2004, 2005 on the elite 
intermediary relationship in global cities). Our quantitative approach to identifying the 
spatial imprint of overseas investment positions itself within the debate around definitions 
of class, analytical strategies to best map class geographies in what is a many-layered urban 
landscape (Butler et al., 2008; Davidson and Wyly, 2015; Hamnett, 2015; Manley and 
Johnston, 2014). And yet our focus on a largely non-resident, overseas transnational elites 
sets our analysis apart but makes it all the more challenging. 
To estimate likely areas in which the overseas investors were to be found, we require 
detailed data on the population. Geodemographic area profiles could provide a way into 
understanding neighborhoods, but here we are interested in a sub group of the population 
that are at the extreme of the income and wealth distribution and so therefore do not appear 
in such classifications. As a result, we use key variables from the 2011 UK Census. It must be 
acknowledged that the data we outline below are imperfect – there is, for instance, no 
question in the Census that asks specially about income or wealth (and where estimates 
are made, the resolution of the estimate is too coarse to be practical for this analysis) – so we 
used a range of indicators which in combination can give a guide to the likely profile of 
residents. However, it is important to realize the nature of the Census data: although 
questions are asked at an individual level, the data are provided as ecological counts. 
Thus, the descriptions we provide relate to the composition of the area, not specific 
individuals and our statistic inference relies on ecological analysis. The comprehensive 
nature of the Census is important to underline, providing enumeration data for the full 
population rather than survey data where only a small proportion of each London 
Borough would likely be captured. We chose the lowest level of aggregation for the UK 
Census – Output Areas (OAs), containing around 100 households on average – for two 
reasons. Firstly, we are looking for localized concentrations of investors and therefore the 
most local level provides the greatest resolution of neighborhood difference. Secondly, OAs 
were designed to maximize tenure homogeneity, and as we are explicitly interested in 
residential consumption, similarity of properties was deemed a useful characteristic 
(Martin et al., 2001). 
We propose that overseas investors and their properties could be characterized by five 
indicators: on the individual side, the investors would be expected to have (1) high status 
employment, (2) high levels of education and (3) overseas passports. Thus, we recorded the 
proportion of individuals with Level 4 (that is a degree or equivalent) or better education, 
employed in the Higher and Professional classes according to the NS-SEC categories, and 
holding non-UK, non-EU passports. Properties were identified as being (4) non-primary 
residence (which in combination with the other characteristics is treated as evidence of 
second homes) and (5) without having a resident household: in other words, a vacant 
property. These variables were combined in a single dataset and each one modeled using 
linear regression. The residuals were identified and those OAs with significant positive 
residuals for each variable were highlighted as being potentially outside the expected 
distribution. We coded those areas as being potentially of interest for the investigation: 
where models for all five of the variables provided positive and significant OA residuals, 
we concluded the areas constitute concentrated oversea investor neighborhoods. 
For the qualitative component, we interviewed 18 intermediaries, conveniently sampled 
within the strongest overseas investor territories identified by the quantitative approach 
(Figure 1): the boroughs of (1) Westminster and (2) Kensington and Chelsea. The services 
covered the following activities: high-end real estate agents; research foundations on real 
estate activity in London; nanny services; locksmiths; and one buy-to-let landlord (an owner 
who rents his property to overseas investors in Chelsea), as they were seen to be intimately 
knowledgeable in the trends, motivations and transnational tendencies of overseas investors. 
Over 100 agencies were contacted in the Summer of 2013, with the majority of responses 
clustered in the real estate sector, mainly agents but also those who research the London 
market. The open-ended interviews focused on questions about recent trends in the 
location’s real estate and its relationship to overseas investors, the nature of the overseas 
investors themselves (provenance, income, motivations), the special attraction of London 
(and particularly Inner London), and future trends. If at all possible, those with long-term 
knowledge of the study areas were selected for interviewing. Of course, the key drawback to 
this approach was the lack of success in talking directly to the overseas investors themselves. 
The main barrier was the difficulty in transcending well-known issues of ‘‘gaining access to 
Figure 1. Overseas investor neighborhoods. 
the field, negotiating the unequal status between researchers and their elite respondents; 
mediating the ‘relational effects of power’ as well as the ‘self positioning’ of the researcher 
in order to manage the gap between elites and researchers’’ (Pow, 2011: 383). To partly 
compensate, further secondary material on the geography of London overseas investment 
(e.g. Heywood, 2012; Johnson, 2012; Paris, 2013) was examined to further buttress the ‘‘big 
picture’’ of the quantitative results. 
 
Quantitative results 
Figure 1 estimates those concentrated overseas investor areas. 
The concentrations of likely OAs are north of the River Thames, starting in Kensington 
and Chelsea, not surprisingly all the areas surrounding Hyde Park (e.g. Knightsbridge, 
Mayfair, Belgravia, Holland Park, Kensington) and the spacious terraces and garden 
areas in the western edges of the borough, namely Chelsea. The concentration then moves 
eastwards to include Westminster, stretching from The Mall to Covent Garden and into the 
lightly-populated City of the London, focusing on a triangle around St Paul’s, the Bank of 
England and Cannon Street Station. From there it continues eastwards tightly following the 
London Docklands Light Railway into Tower Hamlets and down to the river in the 
waterfront developments around Canary Wharf. These quantitative results have 
confirmed the less statistically rigorous Smith Institute report (Heywood, 2012) that 
located high-end overseas investment across a swathe of Inner London boroughs, and 
especially Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea. As our study area, these two 
boroughs had more overseas investment than the next eight most popular boroughs for 
overseas investment in Inner London (Heywood, 2012). Unsurprisingly, the two boroughs 
experienced the greatest price increases in the 2007–2013 period (which roughly encapsulates 
the height of the pre-crisis market and the crisis itself), with Westminster rising 43% and 
Kensington and Chelsea 42%, compared to 12% for London overall and an overall decline 
of 9% for England and Wales (Helm, 2013). 
 
Qualitative results 
Related to the imprints and impacts of overseas investment in the study areas, several themes 
emerged from the qualitative interviews: the accelerated scale and scope of the recent flood 
of overseas investors; the peculiar characteristics of the overseas investors and their 
motivations; the thoroughly transnational nature of the investors and their loose ties to 
Inner London; and the subtle role of the state in abetting the process along. 
The recent flood of overseas investors 
Interview and secondary material pointed strongly to the growth and dominance of overseas 
investors, not despite but because of recent global instability that spurred the seeking of safe 
haven investments. As Paris (2013: 105) argued, ‘‘turmoil in many countries during the 
‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, plus mounting unrest and fear of fiscal collapse in euro-zone Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, added to the attraction of London as a safe haven for mobile 
affluent families’’. In the first half of 2011, the Smith Institute estimated that 60% of homes 
in the study area were bought by overseas investors (Johnson, 2012); for all of 2011, over »4 
billion was invested by foreigners (Neate, 2011). For 2011 and 2012, 59% of the highest-end 
sales went to foreigners (Lyall, 2013). And from April 2012 to April 2013, foreign investors 
overtook the number of Britons buying London properties over »2 million (Neate, 2013), 
most of which were again in the study area, and fueling a 57% price increase in prime 
properties between 2009 and 2013. While London has certainly seen waves of 
overseas investors in the past, and from a variety of nations, the post-2008 period is 
different in terms of the accelerated and globalized uncertainty resulting from the global 
meltdown. 
The interview material confirmed and reinforced these secondary findings. There had been 
a dramatic rise in foreign buyers since the 2008 crash, with many spending only a few weeks 
of the year in their investments and not even bothering to rent them out for the remainder. 
As one real estate agent in Sloane Square (Westminster) offered, the investors were 
more international, more affluent, more exclusive. Less affordable, narrow social 
demographic. 
The flipside is that London’s position as hub for global elite has become more pronounced. 
Similarly, in the words of a real estate researcher: 
Property as tangible asset – bricks and mortar in prime areas as attractive, the opposite of the 
banking crisis/debt crisis of highly packaged/unclear financial instruments. The main 
purchasers 
in prime central London market are European – troubled Euro parts like Greece, Cyprus, 
Italy, 
France, Germany. But also Kazakhstan, Russia in the end. India, Pakistan and recently due to 
cheap Pound – Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, with 65% purely as investment. 
As the but-to-let landlord in Chelsea explained, 
There has been a massive increase in investment from the far east – China and Hong Kong – 
and from India, and substantial sums coming from Russia and the Middle East and investors 
spooked by Euro-zone losses who have relocated assets from home countries – especially 
Greece and Italy . . . Their immigrant status will, I imagine, be largely determined by the size 
of their investments, by which I mean that the larger your investment package the 
fewer hoops the government makes you jump through. There is definitely a form of 
economic apartheid when it comes to immigration into the UK from outside the EU (and 
it would have prevented me from coming here from India were the current rules applied to 
me back then). 
Overall then, the study areas were experiencing concentrated overseas investors, recognized 
both by the press and by on-the-ground actors. But who are the investors, and why have they 
targeted London? 
Characteristics and motivations of overseas investors 
The characteristics of overseas investors are largely driven by their desire to safely park 
money in Inner London real estate. Three high-end real estate agents in the borough of 
Kensington and Chelsea confirmed the following: 
London’s always been a strong global city and will stay like this – at the centre of the world 
in 
terms of time-zone. Stable economy. But also – places like Harrods a draw. 
[They are] from difficult areas of the world – looking for prime central London as a safe 
haven. London is the ultimate trophy. 
Underpinning everything is investment – long term investment. Beyond that, London as a 
business centre to work/raise finance/work on connections. Education a big driver – be in 
London when children are here. Lifestyle. Safe haven – people like to have money outside 
their home country – no fear of government intervention or more control, such as China 
which is not democratic. Buyers like these clear rules. With property, no one will change the 
rules suddenly. 
These statements confirmed the safe-haven seeking nature of the investment, especially since 
the crisis in the Eurozone but especially other zones of instability across the world. In the 
words of a real estate researcher: 
Think they will carry on as long as there is financial uncertainty in Europe, political unrest in 
emerging countries of wealth – people will look to safe havens and political/economic 
security. 
These points will be important to a lot of people for a long time – people who have worked 
hard to make money, want to put it somewhere that’s safe but they can also perhaps enjoy it. 
In parallel with the quantitative results, the spatial focus of overseas investment is very much 
on just in a few super-prime areas of the boroughs of Westminster and Kensington and 
Chelsea. As a top-end real estate agent in Chelsea noted, the investment is only in the central 
parts, as a perfect stop-off point. London is a brand. Harrods, London Eye. 
Cultural thing – British, history of London. Capital of Europe. GMT and trading investments. 
Whole number of things draw people in, not just property prices. World highest cost per 
square foot. It’s a stable haven for assets – much more interest than banks . . . as long as it 
continues to be a financial centre – Kensington/Chelsea continues to be desirable. Only a 
certain area and so many people want to buy. London continues to lead, certainly in Europe. 
These quotes point to the strong relationship between the conspicuous lifestyles of the 
superrich combined with London’s embrace of the cosmopolitan and the overseas investor. 
Now that the characteristics and motivations of overseas investment are clearer, we need to 
show their transnational links in more detail. 
 
Transnational nature of overseas investors 
The real estate agents, researchers and other service providers could not help but notice the 
transient and transnational nature of the investors, aligning with Vertovec’s (2009: 3) 
transnationalism as a ‘‘condition in which, despite great distances and notwithstanding 
the presence of international borders . . . certain kinds of relationships have been globally 
intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common . . . arena of 
activity’’. The common arena of activity was high-end real estate, as one agent in 
Knightsbridge put it: 
They own four to five properties and move between them. Maybe only in London for May/ 
June . . . There’s a London season. 
Another real estate agent in Belgravia explained that: 
London is always reasonably safe – same as banking in Switzerland – never 100% but 
reasonably safe haven – odds in your favour. Some would rather live in London than 
Moscow – European lifestyle. I also deal with Arab clients. Too hot in summer in Middle 
East. VIP families – easy to come and go where they like. 
The sheer amount of investors from overseas had created an entirely new dynamic to the real 
estate market in London, prompting many to groom and sell off their properties to 
foreigners in order to reap the benefits of the boom, according to the buy-to-landlord in 
Chelsea: 
Overseas investors have dramatically changed the London property market and lots of 
existing residents (both British and foreign) have sold to take advantage of the Gold Rush 
that is occurring in what the estate agents used to call ‘Prime Central London’ (that is, 
Mayfair, Belgravia, Knightsbridge, Kensington, Chelsea), and which is now ‘Ultra Prime 
Central London’ or some such marketing rubbish, with ‘Prime Central London’ now 
encompassing vast swathes of inner London – Notting Hill, Holland Park and Earl’s Court in 
this borough, and Maida Vale, St John’s Wood, Primrose Hill, Clerkenwell, Islington, 
Highbury, Clapham, Wandsworth, parts of Southwark. 
It would be tempting to see all of this transnationalism as individualistic and to a point 
unfettered, but it is more realistic to say that the state (nationally, and at the borough level) 
has quietly abetted the ‘‘Gold Rush’’, to be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
 
 
 
Role of the state 
Dorling (2014) argued that gross inequality is artificially sustained by the state through 
nontaxation or low taxation; conversely, taxation policies can always be set to soak the 
superrich and bridge the gap. Equally, Ley (2010) reminded us in Vancouver that the national 
state has profound control over overseas investment, in terms of taxation/non-taxation and 
immigration laws. The following quotes from real estate agents and real estate researchers 
point to this artificially-sustained state of affairs in London: 
No question the state encourages through tax exemptions for the first year here. Lack of a 
mansion tax. 
Government leaves the market alone – London a place for millionaires/billionaires. If 
government introduces Hollande-style policies, there would be a similar collapse as in 
France. 
Dire economic consequences as seen in France. All comes down to policy – these people 
spend money. 
State has a huge role to play in encouraging and discouraging. Taxes play a huge part. 
And so the state – in its local, regional and national guises – employs a hands-off set of 
policies that indirectly supports the current glut – yet still retains the power to completely gut 
the sector. A more negative scenario – one envisioned by more than a few of the 
interviewees, and currently contemplated by the new Mayor of London – would be greater 
taxation and disclosure to stem the flow. These emerge out of the myriad drawbacks 
produced by overseas investors and hinted at in the next quote; in the next section we see 
how they fit into pre-existing class geographies in London. As the sole buy-to-let landlord 
noted, 
Overall, I imagine the short term is an increasing polarisation between the rich, the squeezed 
middle and the poor – assuming they haven’t all been shipped off to vacant housing in 
unemployment blackspots – leading to eventual crisis and some attempt to repair the damage. 
But probably too little too late. I don’t know anyone who wants London to resemble high rise 
horrors such as Dubai or Shanghai, or a sort of Paris-on-Thames in which only the super-rich 
can afford to live in the city. What happens to art, culture, music, the vibrant buzz and 
adrenalin that brought us to live here in the first place? What about young people – who are 
so often at the forefront of developments in the arts? Are they to be shut out by the foreign 
rich?  
 
Overseas investment, pied-a`-terre urbanism and existing class geographies of London 
Following up on the last quote, we first contemplate the impacts of overseas investors on the 
social geography and built environment of Inner London. This is followed by how the 
insertion of overseas investors muddles existing class geographies of London, 
inadvertently creating the skeins of a new, yet decidedly attenuated, social contract. 
This reflects the sense that overseas investors do more than just price out certain people 
through knock-on effects – they create a different kind of city, characterized by what we 
will call ‘‘pied-a` -terre’’ urbanism, which goes against traditional ideas of the gregarious city 
(i.e. Jane Jacobs) and replaces it with un-occupation, dullness, emptiness, anonymity, urban 
space as pure exchange value, and convenience for the transient few at the expense of day-
today uses and permanent citizens. Our buy-to-let landlord had this to say about Chelsea: 
There has been a marked increase in the number of large properties bought for investment 
purposes by owners residing overseas for investment and which are mostly un(der)occupied. 
There are parts of the borough – especially those toward Knightsbridge and Belgravia - that 
feel very un-lived in. This has an impact on the kinds of local amenities and facilities which 
one associates with living in the inner city – i.e. access to local restaurants, pubs, shops etc. 
Many of these prove unsustainable if there are no longer enough local residents to support 
them . . . and if you really want to see how often these places are used my advice is to walk 
the streets at night. In certain parts of the borough it really does feel like a ghost town! 
Analyzing this kind of transient urbanism responds to the calls made by Beaverstock et al. 
(2004: 405), who argued that ‘‘geographers have rarely questioned the immense claim that 
the super-rich make on the landscapes of contemporary cities’’. Overseas investment involves 
virtually no day-to-day attachment to and engagement with city space, even less again 
than expatriates (Beaverstock, 2002), sojourners, and Ley’s (2010: 124) ‘‘capitalists sans 
frontie`res’’. Perhaps it is not surprising that global cities, as part of their strategic seeking 
of monied outsiders, demand but limited commitment, that the transnational elite 
‘‘participates in a kind of dysfunctional marriage with the host city that suspends norms 
of permanent belonging’’ (Ong, 2007: 83). For the social geography of London, overseas 
investment leads to the overvaluing of sporadic rather than permanent residents, alongside 
increased class polarization as the upper grows at the expense of the ‘‘squeezed middle’’, 
while the urban poor become entrapped in situ or become displaced. London’s popularity 
has led to its undoing, according to an agent in Chelsea: 
A lot of people want to be able to walk out of their front door and feel that they are in 
London. The sort of feeling you get in New York where you think, yep, this in Manhattan, 
I’ve made it. The trouble is, with increasing numbers of absentee owners, the very thing that 
attracts them in the first place is being diminished. I think lots of Londoners – not all native 
born by any means – are frustrated that their city is being flogged off to foreign investors or 
sovereign wealth funds. I think that if the authorities were serious they would consider using 
the tax system to extract money from the super-rich and non-domiciled property owners to 
fund affordable housing that is offered to resident workers, and not foreign investors. 
 
Impacts upon the built environment are more ambiguous. On the one hand, it is very difficult 
to tear down properties that overseas investors have bought in order to build larger versions, 
akin to what happens in Vancouver with the so-called ‘‘monster homes’’ (Ley, 2010) or on 
the wealthy Westside and beach communities of Los Angeles. On the other hand, there are 
few legal barriers in place to stop renovation and vertical expansion (rooftop and basement). 
As the buy-to-let landlord in Chelsea described, 
There is a gold rush taking place with people desperately adding square footage to their 
already sizable properties in order to maximise their return. This is either foreign investors 
doing so having just bought, or existing residents confident that the one year of renovations 
necessary to increase space by 40% through the use of basement excavations – a bloody 
menace! – will be more than returned once the property hits the market. There is an element 
in which a lot of  people don’t really care about anything beyond themselves and their 
investment and/or shortterm profits. But it has detrimental impacts on those of us that 
actually live here. We have a joke that you can tell which houses are going to be next because 
they have net curtains and this signifies some old dear is still in residence and when she dies 
it’ll be a gut job. It always is. Obviously, this alters the balance of the neighborhood as people 
who have been long term residents are replaced by a more transient population.  
This ‘‘lights-out’’ London represents a fraying of community relations and the social 
contract. The poor, those living in overcrowded conditions (DeVerteuil, 2011), social 
renters (and those on the decade-long waiting lists) and the growing army of the homeless 
will scramble to live day to day in the shadows of those who treat London purely as an asset 
and a global reserve currency, a city divided between those in social housing being fined for 
having empty bedrooms (i.e. the so-called Bedroom Tax) to those who hold on to empty 
houses year-round with impunity. A recent article reported that ‘‘Kensington and Chelsea 
was found to have had a 40% annual increase in empty properties . . . the idea of the most 
expensive homes sitting empty is provocative in a city where any kind of property ownership 
is increasingly out of reach’’ (Cumming, 2015), and it actually lost population between 2001 
and 2011, the only London Borough to do so (Dorling, 2014). 
As the second part of the analysis, how does this pied-a` -terre urbanism fit with 
longstanding class cleavages and complex class dynamics across London? If one ascribes 
to the replacement thesis, then this new urbanism is more about in situ upgrading and the 
erasure of previous elites claims, as overseas investors are only interested in areas of 
wellestablished wealth. But if one ascribes to the displacement thesis, the process of pied-a` -
terre urbanism is potentially profound in terms of producing class antagonisms and perhaps 
displacement. By producing new spaces for the even more affluent, at first glance overseas 
investment looks like a hyperactive version of gentrification, itself invariably deployed as the 
dominant framework for understanding class change in London (Beaverstock et al., 2004: 
405). First, pied-a` -terre urbanism certainly involves a more affluent incoming group – 
although as we have argued, the gap is not particularly large when compared to the gap 
found in gentrifying areas between the incoming and existing residents – and there is some 
landscape change, as noted previously with in situ expansion of the built environment. 
Second, pied-a` -terre urbanism leads to exclusionary displacement, in that top-tier areas 
that once attracted potential gentrifiers may now be out of reach, pushing them out to 
more eastern, northern and southern fringes of Inner London and beyond, and leading to 
greater polarization as gentrification moves into more marginal neighborhoods as formerly 
aspirational areas such as Chelsea and Mayfair become off-limits to all but the richest. A real 
estate agent in Sloane Square noted the knock-on effects on London real estate: 
Because of the vertiginous rise in prices . . . the pressure has come down the chain to smaller 
flats and apartments with overseas investors desperate to claim ownership of what is amongst 
the most valuable real estate in the world . . . As well as pressure coming down the housing 
chain within somewhere like Kensington and Chelsea is has also rippled out – although swept 
out might be a more apt phrase – to adjoining boroughs like Hammersmith and Fulham and 
Wandsworth. And this of course causes its own ripple effects, and these are being felt across 
the whole of London and outward into commuter country. 
But a deeper analysis into overseas investment reveals processes that clearly exceed 
gentrification’s framework, which is why we propose pied-a` -terre urbanism as a useful 
theoretical counterpoint and contribution. Despite gentrification’s forays into global city 
theory (Butler and Lees, 2006), globalization and transnationalism (Bridge, 2007), 
cosmopolitanism (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005; Rofe, 2003) and comparative urbanism 
(Lees et al., 2015), that ‘‘gentrification has gone global and is intertwined with processes of 
globalization . . . no longer confined to the inner city or to the First World metropolises’’ 
(Lees et al., 2008: xvii), we find gentrification rather inadequate as a way to frame substantial 
overseas investment, unsuited to the sheer scale, speed and scope of globalized and 
systematically transnational urban transformation. 
To be more precise, there are at least four reasons for why the process of pied-a` -terre 
urbanism exceeds the traditional gentrification narrative. First, the rent gap differs from the 
typical gentrification scenario, since neither of the boroughs have ever suffered disinvestment 
and the structural violence against working-class people that accompanies it, and only the 
super-rich would find their super-prime real estate a ‘‘good deal’’! Rather, areas like Mayfair 
and Belgravia have always maintained their value and prestige, so pied-a` -terre urbanism is 
about investing somewhere safe and not necessarily because it is a local (or even 
international) bargain – the polar opposite of the speculative nature of exploiting rent 
gaps in disinvested and poor neighborhoods. Second, overseas investors are not gentrifiers 
or even super-gentrifiers, as Butler and Lees (2006) acknowledge (but that Rofe, 2003 
conflates); the former are not homegrown, do not actually work in London, do not create 
a specific habitat or habitus, and are not gentrifying already-gentrified areas such as 
Barnsbury – they prefer established elite areas and superimpose there. Third, pied-a` -terre 
urbanism is thoroughly transnational, and lacks the grounded, localized, even parochial 
nature of gentrification and its close links to the built environment and place-based 
attachments, the literature on which largely ignores the 1%, the super-rich, the 
transnational elite and the overseas investor. Moreover, the exclusionary displacement 
that follows in the wake of overseas investment is certainly not an example of ‘‘social 
cleansing’’, of the lamentable case of the poor being evicted from their longstanding 
abodes, but rather the already well-off being outcompeted by an even richer outsider 
group. Fourth and crucially, pied-a` -terre urbanism is entirely independent of homegrown 
gentrification, as it operates through different circuits of capital entirely and impacts 
different areas. As a real estate agent in Knightsbridge explained, 
Overseas investors focus on [central] wealthy area, historically. Very central/convenient. 
Couldn’t see Russians buying in Brixton [more peripheral, not an established area of wealth] 
even if there are some expensive houses. 
So gentrification is not the only game in London, and hardly the only reason for 
displacement either, which can also include austerity-driven housing current benefits caps 
and welfare cuts (DeVerteuil, 2013, 2015). These alternative explanations counter Lees et al. 
(2016: 110) and their simplistic specification of a transnational hyper-gentrification by 
superrich elites. In the last section, we ponder the implications of certain cities being victims 
of their own success. 
 
Conclusions: Marie Ce´leste cities? 
In this paper, we have used an innovative mixed method approach and the concept of pied-a` 
- 
terre urbanism to understand the imprints and impacts of overseas investment on Inner- 
London social geographies and built environments, but also how it has inserted itself into 
London’s complex class geographies, the logical endgame of which is a more transient, less 
vibrant and increasingly denuded Inner London. Indeed, when one thinks of cities that are 
ghost-towns – the legend of the Marie Ce´leste ghost ship is invoked here – one thinks of 
places like Detroit. But one rarely thinks of wildly successful cities like London, or at least 
the most glamorous parts of London, as suffering from the same malaise. This paper has 
outlined how such a scenario could be occurring, of how parts of London have become too 
popular for their own good. London’s social geography may well be approaching that of 
Paris – an increasingly off-limits and depopulating center with residual middle and working 
classes, what Clerval (2013) called ‘‘Paris sans le peuple’’ (Paris without the people). These 
points echo Harvey (1987), who argued that while affluent groups possess exchange values 
with which to sustain life, they are in no way dependent upon community-provided use 
values for survival. Rather, their construction of community is geared to enhancement of 
exchange values and ‘‘the symbolic and cultural capital that goes with possession of a certain 
kind of ‘valued’ built environment’’ such that ‘‘interpersonal relations are unnecessary at the 
street level’’ (271; see also Atkinson, 2016). 
Moving beyond London and pied-a` -terre urbanism, we argue that these uprooted class 
geographies are intrinsic to the global city: Ley (2010: 150) similarly contended that ‘‘as 
economic and demographic pressures move around the world, global cities and their 
property markets can be expected to be particularly sensitive to these ebbs and flows’’. 
In this context, pied-a` -terre urbanism represents a distinctly convenient and predatory 
version of transnationalism, a bolt-hole for uncertain times rather than a carefully 
cultivated one, or even one orthogonal to state power (Mitchell, 1997; Ong, 1999). 
Nonetheless, it also encapsulates strong notions of economic agency, ingenuity and, dare 
we say, flexibility within a context of actively courting overseas investment in a system of 
‘‘graduated sovereignty’’ (Ong, 1999: 7). Future research must not only engage more directly 
with the overseas investors themselves (Atkinson, 2016) but also those in the medium and 
lower rungs of property investment and its new-build, off-plan nature, in terms of their 
motivations and experiences. Moreover, research ought to focus on populations affected 
by overseas investment, particular those marooned in super-prime areas, who bought long 
ago in elite areas and have seen their property values change drastically. Finally, the flow 
into cities can disappear as quickly as it appears, which behooves researchers to delve more 
deeply into the impacts of currency rate flux, political in/stability, election results and tax 
changes. The recent case of Brexit (June 2016) is a case in point: it may make London less 
secure as a safe haven – certainly for EU investments – or might generate even more demand, 
as London becomes a cheaper locale and the post-Brexit period produces even more 
uncertainty upon which overseas investment feeds. 
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